Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal
Volume 16 | Issue 1

Article 6

1998

Jurisdictional Restraints on the Federal Labor
Relations Authority: A Split in the Circuits
Brian Daniel Pfeiffer

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Pfeiffer, Brian Daniel (1998) "Jurisdictional Restraints on the Federal Labor Relations Authority: A Split in the Circuits," Hofstra Labor
and Employment Law Journal: Vol. 16: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol16/iss1/6

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Labor
and Employment Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact
lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Pfeiffer: Jurisdictional Restraints on the Federal Labor Relations Authorit

JURISDICTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON THE
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY: A
SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS

I. INTRODUCTION

"Federal agencies and labor unions have long operated under collective bargaining laws that differ from private sector labor laws."' The
statutory obligations of agencies and unions in the federal government
are governed by Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
("CSRA"), also known as the Federal Service Labor-Management Re-

lations Statute ("FSLMRS").2
Congress created the Federal Labor Relations Authority ("FLRA"
or "Authority") to review and resolve arbitration disputes between federal agencies and their unions.3 Congress's policy of deference to arbitration awards is evident in the provisions for appellate review of FLRA
decisions.4 An FLRA decision reviewing an arbitration award becomes
final and binding with no opportunity for judicial review unless the
FLRA decision involves a statutory unfair labor practice.5
1. James J. Powers, "PartnershipBuster" in the Federal Government: The Relationship
Between 5 U.S.C. § 7106(A) and (B)(1), 72 Ci. KENT. L. REv. 837 n.1 (1997). Although the right
of federal employees to participate in organizations to improve working conditions was first recognized in 1912, see Lloyd-LaFollette Act, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 555 (1912), it was not until 1962
that an official labor-management relations program for federal employees was established with an
Executive Order by President John F. Kennedy. See Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (19591963). See id. In contrast, the private sector was first regulated in 1926 with the passage of the
Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1994)). The passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 defined the legal basis for collective bargaining for most private sector employees. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49
Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994)). "However, federal, state,
and local governments, as well as agricultural workers, supervisors, and employees covered by the
Railway Labor Act were exempted from coverage." Id. (citations omitted).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1994).
3. See Powers, supra note 1, at 837.
4. See Michele L. Adelman, The D.C.CircuitStruggles with Standardsof Reviewability, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 960, 982 (1988).
5. See 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a)(1); see also United States Dep't of the Interior v. FLRA, 26 F.3d
179, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the FLRA's order did not involve an unfair labor practice,
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Despite the seemingly clear bar on judicial review, the D.C. Circuit
has held that it can review an FLRA decision to determine whether the
FLRA has exceeded its jurisdiction. 6 The Ninth Circuit expressly disa-

greed with the D.C. Circuit's opinion.7 This split in the circuits has created a system whereby judicial review of the FLRA's decision to accept
jurisdiction in a grievance is subject to review, if the appellant has access to the D.C. Circuit. This Note seeks to examine this circuit split and
the conflicting policies behind it, and concludes that the judicial bar of
FSLMRS' precludes federal courts of appeals from the type of review
that the D.C. Circuit advocates.
This Note begins with a brief background of the FLRA and the
statutes that are at issue in the dispute. This is followed by a factual
synopsis of the cases at issue. Next, the statute that created the FLRA,
and grants it the power to adjudicate federal labor disputes, will be
analyzed by considering both the plain meaning of the statute and its
legislative history. Finally, an examination of the respective circuit's
decisions and the policies behind them will be made.
II. BACKGROUND
The CSRA was enacted to provide the first comprehensive statutory scheme for the regulation of federal labor-management relations. 9
Referred to as the FSLMRS,' the enactment of Title VII signaled a
sweeping change in federal labor relations." Prior to the enactment of
and thus was not subject to judicial review); Overseas Educ. Ass'n v. FLRA, 824 F.2d 61, 73
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that in order for a FLRA decision reviewing an arbitral award to be subject to judicial review, a statutory unfair labor practice actually must have been implicated to some
extent in the FLRA order). But see Griffith v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 487, 494-96 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(creating jurisdiction for the D.C. Court of Appeals over FLRA decisions which involve constitutional claims). The implications of the Griffith holding will be explored infra.
6. See United States Dep't of the Treasury, United States Customs Serv. v. FLRA, 43 F.3d
682, 690-91 (D.C. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Customs].
7. See National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 112 F.3d 402, 405 (9th Cir. 1997)
[hereinafter Treasury].

8. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) (1994); see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
9. See ATF v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 91 (1983); PETER B. BROiDA, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL
LABOR RELATIONSAuTHORrrYLAW&PRACTICE, (ch. 1,I,B 10thed. 1997).
10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135; see Steadman v. Governor, 918 F.2d 963, 964 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (explaining that the CSRA refers to the entire statutory scheme by which Congress comprehensively overhauled the civil service system; while the FSLMRA refers specifically to Title VII
by which Congress restructured labor management relations in the federal government).
11. See ATF, 464 U.S. at 92. The Supreme Court stated that:
Title VII [of the CSRA] expressly protects the rights of federal employees "to form,
join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such activity," § 7102, and
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CSRA, a system existed whereby federal employees had limited rights
to engage in concerted activity.' 2 The FSLMRS states that "labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest,"' 3 which strengthened the position of public employee unions while attempting to balance the country's need for an efficient
government. 4
"The [FSLMRS] created a new and independent agency, the Federal Labor Relations Authority, to be primarily responsible for carrying
out the purposes of Title VII [of the CSRA]."' 5 The FSLMRS invests the
FLRA with both rulemaking and adjudicatory powers to "provide leadership in establishing policies and guidance relating to matters under
this chapter."' 6 The FLRA's role in the public sector has been said to be
analogous to that of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") in
regulating private sector labor relations."
The FLRA is composed of a three member, independent, bipartisan
body within the Executive Branch, appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation. In order to fulfill its broad responsibilities,
the FLRA delegates its authority to regional directors or administrative
law judges. 9 The FSLMRS provides that "any collective bargaining
agreement shall provide procedures for the settlement of grievances,
including questions of arbitrability."2 °

imposes on federal agencies and labor organizations a duty to bargain collectively in
good faith, § 7116(a)(5) and (b)(5).... Strikes and certain other forms of concerted activities by federal employees are illegal and constitute unfair labor practices under the

Act, § 7116(b)(7)(A).
Id.
12. See id. at 91-92.
13. 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (1994).
14. See ATF, 464 U.S. at 92.
15. BROIDA, supra note 9, at ch. 1, I, B.

16. 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(1).
17. See ATF, 464 U.S. at 92-93; Turgeon v. FLRA, 677 F.2d 937, 938 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

18. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104.
19. See id. § 7105(e). Section 7105(e) reads:
The Authority may delegate to any regional director its authority under this chapter(a) to determine whether a group of employees is an appropriate unit;
(b) to conduct investigations and to provide for hearings;
(c) to determine whether a question of representation exists and to direct an election;
and
(d) to supervise or conduct secret ballot elections and certify the results thereof.
20. Id. § 7121(a)(1).
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If either party is dissatisfied with the arbitration procedure, that
party may seek review of the award by the FLRA. "If the arbitrator's
decision is attacked 'because it is contrary to any law, rule, or regulation,' the Authority reviews the legal question de novo." 2 If the objection is not one of law, but of contract, the Authority's role is limited to
that of "federal courts in private sector labor-management relations.""
When the FLRA receives a request for review of a case, it either
decides whether to grant the petition for review or sets a briefing

schedule, and ultimately, issues a decision adjudicating the application.2
Appellate jurisdiction of FLRA decisions is controlled by section
701 of the FSLMRS,' which provides in relevant part:
Any person aggrieved by any final order of the Authority other
than an order under-section 7122 of this title (involving an
award by an arbitrator), unless the order involves an unfair labor
practice under section 7118 of this title .... may... institute an
action for judicial review of the Authority's order in the United
States court of appeals.2
The key aspect of controversy that this Note will focus on, within
the structure of federal labor relations, is the United States Court of Ap-

21. See id. § 7122(a). Section 7122(a) declares in relevant part:
Either party to arbitration under this chapter may file with the Authority an exception to
any arbirator's award pursuant to the arbitration.... If upon review the Authority finds
that the award is deficient(1) because it is contrary to any law, rule, or regulation; or
(2) on other grounds similar to those applied by Federal courts in private sector labormanagement relations; the Authority may take such action and make such recommendations concerning the award as it considers necessary, consistent with applicable laws,
rules, or regulations.
Id.
22. Customs, 43 F.3d at 686-87; see 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a)(I).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a)(2). "If upon review the Authority finds that the award is deficient ...on other grounds similar to those applied by federal courts in private sector labormanagement relations; the Authority may take such action and make such recommendations concerning the award as it considers necessary." Id. See, e.g., Customs, 43 F.3d at 687; see also
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (stating that a
district court must enforce an arbitration award if it draws its essence from the parties' agreement).
24. See BROIMA, supra note 9, at ch 2, II,
A.
25. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) (1994).
26. Id. "Although the statute refers to section 7118, this reference is a misprint. The correct
reference section is 7116, which sets forth unfair labor practices under the statute." Michele L.
Adelman, The D.C.CircuitStruggles with Standardsof Reviewability, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv 960,
982 n.151 (1988); see American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1923 v. FLRA, 675 F.2d 612,
613 n.2 (4th Cir. 1982).
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peal's jurisdiction to review FLRA decisions that do not involve an unfair labor practice.
Il. FACTUAL SYNOPSIS AND OVERVIEW OF CUSTOMS AND TREASURY
The two cases at issue are factually similar, with only procedural
distinctions, which will be discussed within this Note. The disputes
centered around the Tariff Act,27 the federal customs law which required
ships originating from a foreign port to make formal entry with United
States customs officials before unloading any goods or passengers at a
United States port." At the time of the controversy, formal entry was
made by a ship's master presenting various documents, such as the
ship's manifest,' to customs officials at the port's customhouse. 0 Since
the formal entry procedure can be time-consuming, and because ships
often arrive when customhouses are closed, Congress also provided for
"preliminary entry" to enable unloading prior to formal entry.31 When
preliminary entry was requested, the Customs Service would arrange to
have customs personnel available to meet the vessel and receive the
manifest, after which cargo could be unloaded and stored pending formal entry. 2 The preliminary entry system enabled customs agents to
work3 a considerable amount of overtime, which was paid by the shipper.
In the D.C. Circuit case, United States Customs Service v. FLRA
(Customs), the grievance arose in 1990 when the Southeast Region of
the Customs Service adopted the Coastwise Advanced Preliminary En-

27. 19 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1988) (amended 1993). Section 1448(a) of the Tariff Act states in
relevant part:
[N]o merchandise, passengers, or baggage shall be unladen from any vessel or vehicle
arriving from a foreign port or place until entry of such vessel or report of the arrival of
such vehicle has been made and a permit for the unlading of the same issued by the appropriate customs officer.

Id.
After the FLRA decided the case in United States Dep't of Treasury, United States Customs Serv.
v. National Treasury Employees Union, 46 F.L.R.A. No. 137 (1993), Congress amended § 1448(a)
so as expressly to provide for preliminary entry through electronic communication. See Pub.L. No.
103-182, Title VI, § 656, 107 Stat. 2211 (1993); Customs, 43 F.3d at 686.
28. See Customs, 43 F.3d at 684.
29. A manifest is defined as an invoice of cargo for a ship. See WEBSTRs NEw COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 693 (1980).
30. See 19 U.S.C. § 1434 (1988) (amended 1993).
31. See id.; Customs, 43 F.3d at 684.
32. See Customs, 43 F.3d at 684.
33. See id.; 19 U.S.C. § 261 (1988) (repealed 1993).
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program streamlined the preliminary entry

process by using a technological innovation, which enabled incoming
vessels to transmit manifests electronically.35 CAPE eliminated the

physical transfer of manifests to waiting customs officials, which in
turn, eliminated boarding as a routine aspect of preliminary entry: 6 This
consequence of the program resulted in a loss of overtime work assigned to customs agents, as they were no longer needed to meet incoming ships at odd times during the night."
The customs inspector's exclusive representative, the National
Treasury Employees Union ("NTEU"), filed a grievance' over the
Customs Service implementation of the CAPE program.39 NTEU alleged
that the implementation of CAPE violated a provision of the Tariff
Act,' which stated that a vessel could make entry to a port by presenting
the manifest "to the customs officer who boards such vessel."'" This
provision, NTEU alleged, required that vessel entry necessary to allow
the unlading of cargo could only be effected by a customs inspector
boarding the vessel. 42 As CAPE eliminated this boarding requirement,43
the union claimed that the Customs Service had violated the Tariff Act."
The arbitrator originally dismissed the union's complaint on the grounds
that the Tariff Act45 was not, under the definition of a grievance in the
34. See Customs, 43 F.3d at 684.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. The FSLMRS defines grievance in part as any complaint concerning "(i) the effect or
interpretation, or a claim of breach, of a collective bargaining agreement; or (ii) any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation affecting conditions of
employment." 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(9)(C) (1994).
39. See Customs, 43 F.3d at 684.
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1988) (amended 1993).
41. Brief for Respondent at 2, United States Dep't of the Treasury, United States Customs
Serv. v. FLRA, 43 F.3d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No. 93-1388). The Customs Service argued that
there could not be review of their decision to use the CAPE program because it was essential that
the Customs Service be able to assign work and to determine the agency's mission pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 7106 (1994). See Brief for Petitioner at 2, United States Dep't of the Treasury, United
States Customs Serv. v. FLRA, 43 F.3d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No. 93-1388); see also 5 U.S.C. §
7106 (1994) (setting forth the rights of management). This argument was summarily rejected in
Customs. See Customs, 43 F.3d at 690.
42. See Customs, 43 F.3d at 685.
43. A direct consequence of the elimination of the boarding requirement was a "diminution
in the amount of lucrative overtime work assigned to customs agents, who were no longer needed
to meet arriving vessels at odd hours of the day or night." Id. at 684. The diminution of overtime
work provided the motive for the union to file a grievance. See id.
44. See id.
45. 19 U.S.C. § 1448 (1988).
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FSLMRS,4' "a law... affecting conditions of employment. ' 4' The arbitrator reasoned that although CAPE could be thought of to "affect
conditions of employment," every law-related action of the Agency has
some impact on its employees. Therefore, the arbitrator ruled that a
mere effect on employees was an insignificant connection to establish
an arbitratable grievance; in order to constitute a grievance, a particular
law, rule, or regulation must fall within the "zone of interest."'49
The NTEU appealed the arbitrator's decision to the FLRA, which
has authority to review arbitration awards pursuant to the FSLMRS. ° In
United States Customs Service v. National Treasury Employees Union,51
the FLRA determined that the arbitrator had too narrowly construed the
term "grievance" and found that there were no definitional constraints
on the available grounds for grievances under the FSLMRS,52 other than
that the
law in question "affects" conditions of employment in some
3
way.
The FLRA remanded the case to the arbitrator who determined that
under the FLRA's definition of grievance, the issue was an arbitratable
dispute." Further, the arbitrator found that CAPE violated the Tariff Act
by dispensing with the physical boarding of vessels by customs agents."
The arbitrator awarded the relevant customs officials back pay for overtime which was lost due to the CAPE program.56
The Customs Service appealed this decision to the FLRA. 57 The
FLRA found for the Union and upheld the arbitrator's award." Customs

46. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(9) (1994); Customs, 43 F.3d at 684.
47. Id. § 7103 (a)(9)(c)(ii); see Customs, 43 F.3d at 685.
48. See Customs, 43 F.3d 682, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
49. See id. at 685. Whether a law falls within the "zone of interest" is detemnined by examining whether the law was intended to benefit the employees on whose behalf the grievance was
brought. See id.
50. 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a) (1994); see supranote 21.
51. 43 F.L.R.A. No. 72 (1992). This was the FLRA's first review of the arbitrator's decision.
The FLRA then remanded the case to the arbitrator with instructions. See Customs, 43 F.3d at 48586. After the arbitrator held that the CAPE program was in violation of the Tariff Act, this case
was once again appealed to the FLRA. See U.S. Dep't of Treasury v. National Treasury Employees
Union, 46 F.L.R.A. No. 137 (1993).
52. See United States Customs Serv. v. National Treasury Employees Union, 43 F.L.R.A.
No. 72 (1992); 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(9)(c).
53. See Customs, 43 F.3d at 685-86.
54. See id. at 686.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Customs, 43 F.3d at 686.
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Service then petitioned the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for
review.
The D.C. Circuit held that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to
review the case for the limited purpose of determining whether the
FLRA exceeded its jurisdiction, despite the plain language of section
7123(a). 9 Exercising this newly created limited right to review, the D.C.
Circuit determined that the FLRA had exceeded its jurisdiction.6 The
court concluded that the arbitrator "essentially got it right the first
time '6 and found that the section of the Tariff Act62 did not fall under
the definition of grievance as set forth in the FSLMRS.63
The factual scenario in the Ninth Circuit case, National Treasury
Employees Union v. FLRA (Treasury)," is very similar to that in Customs, with the exception that the program at issue in Treasury, while the
same substantive program as CAPE, was named the Radio Preliminary
Entry program ("RPE").
Procedurally, however, the cases are not analogous. In Treasury,
the arbitrator originally found for the NTEU and awarded back pay to
the affected customs workers." The Customs Service filed exceptions to
the arbitrator's decision with the FLRA. 67 The FLRA found that
NTEU's challenge to RPE was not arbitratable under the FSLMRS."9
Thus, in Treasury, the NTEU alleged that the FLRA had underreached
by failing to find the jurisdiction over the relevant section of the Tariff
Act. In Customs, however, the Customs Service lost at the FLRA level
and argued that the FLRA had overreached by holding that the Tariff
Act was abitrable.7 o

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. at 690.
See id. at 690-91.
Id. at 691.
19 U.S.C. § 1448 (1988) (amended 1993).
5 USC § 7103(a)(9)(C) (1994); see Customs, 43 F.3d at 690.
112 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1997).
See Treasury, 112 F.3d at 405.
See id. at 404.

67. See id.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(9)(C); see Treasury, 112 F.3d at 404. The FLRA held that National
Treasury Employees Union's challenge to the RPE program was not arbitrable under 5 U.S.C. §
7103(a)(9)(C), which sets forth the possible grounds for a grievance. See Treasury, 112 F.3d at
404.
69. See Brief for Intervenor at 7, Treasury, 112 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-70714).
"Under-reaching" is a term defined by the author as an adjudicatory body declining to assert jurisdiction, where such jurisdiction is proper.
70. See Customs, 43 F.3d at 686.
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The Ninth Circuit dismissed the Union's suit for lack of jurisdiction." The court expressly rejected the D.C. Circuit's decision in Customs stating, "[w]e are not persuaded by the D.C. Circuit's opinion and
therefore decline to follow it. The language of [section] 7123 is clearjudicial review of the FLRA's decision regarding an arbitrator's award
'
is precluded unless it involves an unfair labor practice."72
This split in the circuits creates an asymmetrical scheme for the
judicial review of federal arbitration cases. 73 It is important for the judiciary to be uniform in deciding whether they can review the FLRA's
decision that a grievance is arbitrable and hence within their jurisdiction. The disparate result of the two cases in the respective circuits will
encourage federal agencies and unions, in want of judicial review, to
shop their dispute to the D.C. Circuit for adjudication.
However, it is important to note that the D.C. Circuit does not
claim that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over all FLRA decisions. It asserts that the Court of Appeals has the power to review only
whether the FLRA exceeded its jurisdiction in reviewing a dispute.74
Thus, the D.C. Circuit decision ensures that the FLRA is not exercising
unbridled power by deciding cases outside of the scope which Congress
intended.
IV. INTERPRETING THE STATUTE

The main focus of the conflicting opinions between the two circuits
was the jurisdictional issue, to wit, whether the FSLMRS precluded judicial review of decisions of the FLRA. It is well established that unless
a grant of jurisdiction over a particular case affirmatively appears, a
federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction.7 5 It is, therefore, essential
to examine the plain meaning of the relevant parts of the FSLMRS in
order to help determine whether a grant of jurisdiction exists. The powers and duties of the FLRA are set forth in the FSLMRS which provides
in pertinent part: "[tihe Authority shall... resolve exceptions to arbitra-

71. See Treasury, 112 F.3d at406.
72. Id.
73. See Brief for Respondent at 13, Treasury, 112 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-70714).
74. See Customs, 43 F.3d 682, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
75. See General Atomic Co. v. United Nuclear Corp., 655 F.2d 968 (9thCir. 1981) (holding
that provisions of the Arbitration Act did not confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the federal
district court to entertain applications for the confirmation of arbitration awards); Treasury, 112
F.3d at 403.
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tor's awards under section 7122. ' ' 76 Parties may assert exceptions 77to an
arbitrator's award pursuant to the relevant section of the FSLMRS.
After a grievance is decided by the FLRA, section 7123(a) of the
FSLMRS precludes judicial review of the decision "unless the order involves an unfair labor practice. 78
The Ninth Circuit found that the FSLMRA clearly bans the judicial
intervention of the Court of Appeals in decisions of the FLRA that do
not involve an unfair labor practice allegation.79 The court stated:
The plain language of this section [5 U.S.C. § 7123(a)] makes it clear
that a circuit court can review a final decision of the FLRA involving
an arbitrator's award only if an unfair labor practice is involved. It is
undisputed that the present case does not involve an unfair labor practice. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, the FLRA's
decision is unreviewable. 80
V. HISTORY OF THE D.C.

CIRcuIT's INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 7123

The seminal case in the D.C. Circuit which interpreted section
7123(a) was Overseas EducationAssociation v. FLRA (OEA)."' In OEA,
the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the FSLMRS was seemingly consistent with other circuits around the country in precluding judicial review
where there was no allegation of an unfair labor practice. "
In Griffith v. FLRA,83 for the first time, the D.C. Circuit created a
new type of jurisdiction over FLRA decisions that did not involve an
unfair labor practice." Although the D.C. Circuit reiterated its position
that judicial review of FLRA decisions was precluded,85 the court held
76. 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(2)(H) (1994).

77. See id. § 7122(a).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a)(1) (1994).
79. See Treasury, 112 F.3d 402, 406 (9th Cir. 1997).
80. Id.
81. 824 F.2d 61 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
82. See OEA, 824 F.2d at 63 (stating that "the statute as a general matter removes FLRA
decisions reviewing arbitral awards from judicial review, but carves out an exception ... arbitral
decisions are to be subjected to judicial scrutiny only when the FLRA's order 'involves an unfair
labor practice"').
83. 842 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
84. See Griffith, 842 F.2d at 501.
85. See id. at 492. The court stated:
[T]he specific language of [section] 7123, the structure of the CSRA arbitration and
review provisions, and the relevant legislative history all provide clear and convincing
evidence that Congress intended to cut off judicial review of FLRA decisions regarding
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that because there was no explicit preclusion to the review of constitutional claims, the court could review such claims. 6
In Griffith, the appellant asserted that the FLRA's disposition of
her claim deprived her of "property" without due process, in violation of
the Fifth AmendmentY Although the court ruled against her, the D.C.
Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the constitutional claim.88

The court stated, "[t]he maxim that congressional preclusion of judicial
review must be 'clear and convincing' applies 'in a particularly rigorous
fashion,' . . . when constitutional claims are at stake." 89 The Court decided that because neither the statute itself, nor the legislative history
expressly precludes review of constitutional claims, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review them.9°
Although Griffith is a constitutional issue, and of much greater importance from a policy standpoint than the jurisdictional issue being
discussed in this Note, the Griffith decision demonstrates a willingness
of the D.C. Circuit to look beyond the FSLMRS's blanket preclusion of
judicial review, and to usurp jurisdiction to review a decision made by
the FLRA. 9'

arbitral awards ....

Congress could hardly have made its view on the matter clearer.

Id.
86. See id. at 494-95. The Court held, "[t]his silent deletion is not enough, under our cases,
to support an inference of intent to preclude constitutional claims." Id. at 495. This decision is well
supported because of the separation of powers created by the Constitution. It would be undesirable
to have an executive agency ruling on constitutional matters. However, an argument can be made,
albeit a weak one, that Congress intended to have the FLRA decide collateral constitutional issues
without judicial review. The conference committee dropped the provision which would have provided for the review of FLRA decisions arising under the Constitution. It could, therefore, be argued that because this clause was discussed and dropped, Congress intended constitutional claims
to be decided by the FLRA. See HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT ON CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF
1978, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1777, at 153, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2887.
87. See Griffith, 842 F.2d at 490. The property at issue was an interest in an annual withingrade pay increase.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 494; Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Bartlett court
stated:
It is axiomatic that this presumption [of judicial review of administrative action] can be
overcome only by "clear and convincing evidence" that Congress intended to restrict
access to judicial review.... Courts have applied this "clear and convincing" standard
in a particularly rigorous fashion when constitutional rights form the basis of the action
over which judicial action is sought.
Id.
90. See Griffith, 842 F.2d at 494.
91. The Ninth Circuit has yet to address the issue decided in Griffith, specifically, whether
the court of appeals has the authority to review an FLRA decision involving a constitutional claim.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

11

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 6
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal
[Vol. 16:201
VI. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FSLMRS

The legislative history of the FSLMRS92 supports the nearly
unanimous interpretation of the United States Court of Appeals, with
the exception of the D.C. Circuit, in precluding the judicial review of
FLRA decisions that do not involve an unfair labor practice or a constitutional issue. The House Report states:
[There will be no judicial review of the Authority's action on those
arbitrators awards in grievance cases which are appealable to the
Authority. The Authority will only be authorized to review the award
of the arbitrator on very narrow grounds similar to the scope of judicial
review of an arbitrator's award in the private sector. In light of the
limited nature of the Authority's review, the conferees determined it
would be inappropriate for there to be subsequent review by the court
of appeals in such matters. 9'
Further, the Congress specified in the FSLMRS that the FLRA was
to review arbitrator's decisions on grounds "similar to those applied by
federal courts in private sector labor-management relations." ' Congress
thus appears to have intended that the FLRA would perform the same
role assigned to district courts in private sector labor law."
In the private sector, the Supreme Court has exalted the role of the
arbitrator in labor-management disputes and set forth a general policy of
judicial deference to the decisions of arbitrators. 96 This analogy to private sector labor relations is further evidence of Congress's intent to
keep the judiciary out of arbitration rulings. The traditional approach to
the judicial review of FLRA decisions may be summed up by a quote
from the D.C. Circuit in Grffith,' where the court, in referring to the
availability of judicial review for a non-constitutional claim stated,

92. Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act § 701, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1994).
93. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1717, at 153 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2887.
94. 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a)(2) (1994).
95. See Griffith, 842 F.2d at 491.
96. See id. at 492; see also United Steelworkers v. American Mfg., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960)
(stating that "[t]he courts ... have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering
whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in
the written instrument which will support the claim"); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
97. 842 F.2d 487 (1988).
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"[w]e find unusually clear congressional intent generally to foreclose
review" 98
In Customs, the D.C. Circuit altered its position in order to review
whether the FLRA had exceeded its jurisdiction by ruling on a grievance. 9 This change in position was based on policy judgments, whereby
the court called the entire structure of the FLRA into question. 00
The United States Supreme Court has stated that access to judicial
review should be limited "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing
evidence' of a contrary legislative intent.'' ° This presumption of judicial review is determined "not only from its express language, but also
from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative
history, and the nature of the administrative action involved. ' 1r 2 The
D.C. Circuit's argument for judicial review ignores both the plain
meaning and legislative history of the statute and instead uses the
structure and policies behind the FSLMRS to justify their review. Although the D.C. Circuit's view has not garnered support, the opinion has
essentially created a new issue by calling into question whether the legislature intended to confer upon the FLRA this relatively large power. It
is this discussion of policy that is at the heart of these two conflicting
opinions.
VI. AN INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMS
In Griffith, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded
that the jurisdictional bar of the FSLMRS 3 precludes the review of
FLRA rulings that do not include an unfair labor practice charge or a
constitutional claim."°4 However, the court in Customs created a new,
third category of FLRA rulings that are subject to judicial review.'0 5
The court, reflecting on the lack of limitations on the FLRA,
framed the central issue of the case as follows:,

98. m at 490.
99. See Customs, 43 F.3d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
100. See id. at 689-90.
101. Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 769, 779, 791 (1985) (holding that while the "factual underpinnings" of the statute in question may not be judicially reviewed, such review is available to
determine whether there were errors of law or procedure).
102. Il- at 779.
103. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) (1994).
104. See Griffith v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 487,501 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
105. See Customs, 43 F.3d at 690-91.
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Can it be that the FLRA's interpretation of any "law"--including the
Constitution, judicial decisions, or any statute-is immune from judicial review. (On the Authority's understanding, it is not even open to
us to ask whether a particular law has any effect whatsoever on employment conditions; once the Authority is satisfied that a law falls
within the limitation imposed by § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii) ("any law, rule, or
regulation affecting conditions of employment"), its determination to
that effect would foreclose our review.)' °6
Thus, the central issue of the case was whether the Court of Appeals
could review claims that the FLRA had abused its jurisdiction in deciding a grievance.
The D.C. Circuit held that "[section] 7123(a) (the preclusion of
judicial review of arbitrated disputes) must be read in light of [section]
7103(a) (the definition of permissible grounds for grievances)."' 7 The
court inferred that Congress intended that an arbitrator should never interpret a law that did not affect working conditions. 3 Therefore, although the statute in question affected working conditions, it was not
the primary goal, nor the purpose of the statute."° The effect on working
conditions was obviously incidental to the true purpose of the statute.
In a statement that defines their position on the merits of the case,
the D.C. Circuit stated:
Absolutely any law could under some circumstances have some adverse consequences on the working conditions of one or more employees. The Authority's definition thus does not restrict the category of
laws that may be brought to arbitration, but only suggests that a law
may be the subject of a grievance if an employee is somehow aggrieved by its application-which in essence reduces the limitation to a
standing requirement. We think, rather, that a "law, rule, or regulation
affecting conditions of employment" can be only interpreted, as it initially was by the arbitrator in this case, to confine grievances to alleged
violations of a statute or regulation that can be said to have been issued
for the very purpose of affecting the working conditions of employees-not one that merely incidentally does so.1o
Using their newly created third category of FLRA decisions that
are reviewable, the D.C. Circuit ruled that a grievance "predicated on a
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id at 688.
Ia at 689.
See id.
See id.
Customs, 43 F.3d at 689.
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claim of violation of a law that is not directed toward employee working
conditions is outside both the arbitrator's and the FLRA's jurisdiction.''Il
The court reached the merits of the case by reasoning that Congress
could not have intended that a substantial part of American law would
be interpreted by the FLRA. 12 As evidence of this proposition, the court
pointed out that there had been no congressional debate as to what
would amount to a tremendous delegation of power to be given to an
administrative tribunal." 3 The court emphatically stated, "[tihat Congress would entrust such sweeping authority to a minor three-member
commission with quite restricted
expertise is, when one ponders the
14
matter, utterly inconceivable."'
The Court concluded:
A grievance claiming a "violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication
of a law, rule, or regulation" may be brought under §
7103(a)(9)(C)(ii) ...if the particular legal authority relied upon was

fashioned for the purpose of regulating the working conditions of employees. Our review is available for the limited purpose of determining
whether the Authority exceeds its jurisdiction."'
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged in Customs the existence of the
Leedom exception 16 to circumvent the preclusion of judicial review but
111. Id.
112. See id at689-90.

113. Seeid.at690.
114. Id. In a footnote, the court added:
Major administrative boards and commissions (such as, for example, the Federal Communication Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the National Labor Relations
Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission) usually have at least five members at
the rank of executive level 4 and a chairman at level 3.... The Authority's two members are level 5 officials and its chairman is at level 4.
Id. at 690 n.10.
115. Id. at 690-91.
116. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190 (1958). Leedom stands for the proposition that if an
agency openly violates a clear mandate of a statute, even a preclusion of judicial review will not
bar judicial intervention. See Customs, 43 F.3d at 688. The Leedom exception confers jurisdiction
upon a district court in those cases where direct appellate review is presumptively foreclosed. The
Leedom exception is a narrow one, and is not to apply simply when "an erroneous assessment of
the particular facts ...has led it to a conclusion which does not comport with the law." Boire v.
Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964). The Leedom exception is only to apply when there is
an attempted exercise of power that had been specifically withheld. See Leedom, 358 U.S. at 190.
In Leedom, contrary to 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1), which prohibits placing both professional and nonprofessional employees in the same bargaining unit unless a majority of professional employees
vote for inclusion in such unit, the NLRB included in a collective bargaining unit employees
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ruled that it did not apply because there was "no such clear transgression of a substantive statutory mandate."'1 7
The D.C. Circuit has not directly addressed the jurisdictional issue
since Customs, however, the court seemed to waiver in its support of
this new form of jurisdiction in a recently decided case."' In American
Federationof Government Employees v. FLRA," 9 the D.C. Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a case under section 7123.120
The court stated that the case does not come within the compass of
Customs, "pursuant to which this court might have jurisdiction to review
the Authority's decisions.' 2 1 The court does not appear confident in
their new exception to the jurisdictional bar.

VII. THE NINTH CIRcurrs's

RESPONSE IN TREASURY

In Treasury, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the D.C. Circuit's
holding in Customs, on the grounds that the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review FLRA decisions that do not involve an unfair labor
practice." Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, the Court of Appeals cannot review claims that the FLRA has abused its jurisdiction in deciding a
grievance.
The court in Treasury concluded that the language of FSLMRS'2 is
clear, specifically, that judicial review of the FLRA's decision regarding
an arbitrator's award is precluded unless it involves an unfair labor
practice.2" The Ninth Circuit expressly stated, "[w]e are not persuaded
by the D.C. Circuit's opinion and therefore decline to follow it."' ' The
court systematically discredited the arguments that the D.C. Circuit

whom it found to be nonprofessional employees. The Supreme Court held that the Board's action
deprived professional employees of a right assured to them by Congress and therefore a federal
district court had jurisdiction of the original suit to set aside the bargaining unit. See id. at 191.
117. Customs, 43 F.3d at 688.
118. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2986 v. FLRA, 130 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir.

1997).
119. 130 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
120. See id. at 451.
121. Id. The case was decided by two of the three judges that heard Customs.
122. See Treasury, 112 F.3d 402, 406 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit made no mention of
the constitutional exception set forth by the D.C. Circuit in Griffith v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 487 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).

123. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a) (1994).
124. See Treasury, 112F.3d at404.
125. IL at405.
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proffered in finding that the court of appeals may review the FLRA's
determination that a grievance falls within its jurisdiction. '26
In response to the D.C. Circuit's argument that it is "utterly inconceivable" that Congress would make such a "staggering delegation" of
interpretive authority to the FLRA,'27 the court stated:
We find 'utterly inconceivable' arguments a poor substitute for clear
statutory language. In any event, we do not read the delegation of
authority to the FLRA as quite so broad as perceived by our D.C. Circuit colleagues, nor do we view the congressional decision to preclude
judicial review of certain FLRA orders as quite so extraordinary.'2
In addressing the D.C. Circuit's fear "that all or any part of American law would be definitively interpreted by the FLRA,"' 29 the Ninth
Circuit countered, "It]he FLRA only has the authority to determine the
implications of such laws on labor relations; the agency is not forced to
conform its substantive actions to the FLRA's interpretation.""'3 The
court in Treasury emphasized the fact that the FLRA could not have
forced the Customs Service to change their policy, but could only require the agency to compensate its employees who were adversely affected by the policy. ' In the next sentence, however, the court recognized the weakness of their argument, admitting that cost can affect
substantive decisions. 32
The Ninth Circuit believed it was significant that this dispute involved two executive branch agencies and executive branch employees. 3 3 They did not find it inconceivable for Congress to have decided
that the executive branch should work out its disputes from within, free
from interference from the judicial branch. 3"4 The court reasoned that
ultimately, everyone involved is answerable to the President, "who has

126. See id. at 405-06.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See Customs, 43 F.3d at 690.
Treasury, 112 F.3d at 405.
Customs, 43 F.3d at 689-90.
Treasury, 112 F.3d at 405.

131. See id.
132. See id. Following the FLRA decision in Customs, the Customs Service would have been
forced to pay the overtime back pay that the customs officers would have received but for CAPE.
The Tariff Act mandates that over-time pay is to be charged to shippers. See 19 U.S.C. § 216
(1988); Customs, 43 F.3d at 686. Therefore, if the Customs Service did not change their CAPE
program, they would risk bearing overtime costs that they would not, ordinarily, be responsible

for.
133. See Treasury, 112F.3d at405.
134. See id.
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various informal remedies available if he is dissatisfied with FLRA de13 Based on this argument, the court believed it to be likely that
cisions.""
Congress intended "just what it said-that the judicial branch stay out of
the business
of reviewing FLRA decisions involving an arbitration
, 136
award.
The court next attacked the D.C. Circuit's construction of section
7123(a), in which the D.C. Circuit stated that section 7123(a) must be
read in conjunction with section 7103(a)(9), which defines the possible
grounds for a "grievance."' 37 The Ninth Circuit noted that Congress left
the definition of "grievance" "' vague, therefore, the court held that the
D.C. Circuit's interpretation would require the court to infer congressional intent from an ambiguous statutory provision to override a clear
statutory command, specifically, the bar on judicial review.'39
The Ninth Circuit argued that Congress knew that an award of an
arbitrator would involve more than just the primary resolution of a
"grievance."' 4 As evidence of this proposition, the court cited section
7121(a)(1), "in which Congress specified that 'procedures for the settlement of grievances' must include the resolution of 'questions of arbitrability. ' '"' 41 Therefore, the court argued, when Congress barred review
of FLRA decisions "involving an award by an arbitrator," it also necessarily barred review of FLRA decisions involving questions of arbitrability, including whether a law "affects conditions of employment." 141
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the D.C. Circuit had exaggerated
the threat of overreaching by the FLRA. 143 The court argued that if the
FLRA was to act in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a
specific statutory prohibition, federal district courts would have jurisdiction to intervene under Leedom.'"
The Ninth Circuit found the D.C. Circuit's claim that section
7123(a) must be read in conjunction with section 7103(a)(9) to be

135. Id. An example is refusing to re-appoint FLRA members when their terms expire. See id.
136. Id.
137. See id.; see also supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C. Circuit's construction of 5 U.S.C. § 7103 (1994)).
138. See 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(9)(C)(ii) (1994). Section 7103 states that a grievance encompasses "any claimed violation... of any law ... affecting conditions of employment." Id.
139. See Treasury, 112 F.3d at 405-06.
140. See id. at 406.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. See Treasury, 112 F.3d at 406; see also supra note 116 (explaining the basis for judicial
review created in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958)).
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strained. 145 Indeed, "Congress knew that 'an award by an arbitrator'
would involve more than the resolution of a 'grievance.", 146 Congress's
intent seemed to allow the FLRA to completely resolve disputes between federal agencies and their unions. Thus, they intended to create a
system whereby the judiciary would be kept out of federal labor disputes.
VIII. THE POLICY ARGUMENTS BEHIND THE DECISIONS

It is important to begin any discussion regarding the preclusion of
judicial review of FLRA decisions by recognizing the primary policy
rational for preclusion; to wit, "[t]o give district courts review of FLRA
decisions would tend to redundancy and would imperil the features of
the arbitral process that we believe Congress had in mind when it set up
the scheme: finality, speed and economy."'47 The D.C. Court of Appeals
recognized that the entire purpose of Congress's barring judicial review
of most Authority arbitration decisions was4 to facilitate the prompt, final resolution of federal sector grievances.1 1
This policy argument, favoring the finality of FLRA decisions, can
be seen in court decisions where the dispute at issue is categorized as a
contract grievance and thus not subject to judicial review. 49 Ideally, an
aggrieved party to a contract grievance would also like to be able to
claim an unfair labor practice in order to obtain appellate review. This
was contemplated by the Congress who left the route selection to the
discretion of the aggrieved party, but that the selection of one route
precluded use of the other.'50 Indeed, a number of the circuits have concluded that they lack jurisdiction when a statutory unfair labor practice
was not raised in the original FLRA case.'5'
145. See Treasury, 112 F.3d at 405.
146. ladat 406.
147. Griffith 842 F.2d at 491; see also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 777
F.2d 751, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that the legislative history underscores the congressional
intent that the arbitration process provide an efficient, expeditious mechanism for resolving federal
labor-management disputes).
148. See Overseas Educ. Ass'n v. FLRA, 824 F.2d 61, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating the rationale for circumscribed judicial review is "firmly grounded in the strong Congressional policy
favoring arbitration of labor disputes and accordingly granting arbitration results substantial final-

ity").
149. See id.; United States Marshals Serv. v. FLRA, 708 F.2d 1417, 1418 (9th Cir. 1983)
(stating that the court of appeals may review an FLRA decision only if an unfair labor practice is
either an explicit or necessary ground of the decision issued by the FLRA).
150. See Overseas Educ. Ass'n, 824 F.2d at 64.
151. See id. at 66. The court explained:
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In interpreting section 7123(a), courts have cited Congress's general pro-arbitration policy as being the primary rationale for its refusal
to re-characterize a contract dispute as an unfair labor practice for purposes of judicial review. 5 2 The court in United Marshals Service v.
FLRA53 stated:
To say that we have jurisdiction whenever a contract dispute can also
fit within the unfair labor practice sections of the Act, though it has not
been so treated either by the arbitrator or the Authority, would be to
give too little scope and effect to the arbitration process and to the final
review function of the Authority, procedures deemed important to the
expeditious review that Congress made a central part of the Act. '4
Thus, the Ninth Circuit interpreted section 7123(a) to mean that a
statutory unfair labor practice is an "unvarying requirement" to obtain
judicial review.' Underlying conduct that could be characterized as a
statutory unfair labor practice will not suffice to obtain appellate review
in the court of appeals. 5 6 The Marshal and Overseas decisions demonstrate that the intention of Congress was to create a pro-arbitration
scheme which valued speed and finality trumps the parties rights to
further judicial review.
What does seem clear is that Congress required that a statutory unfair labor practice
actually be implicated to some extent in the Authority's order. While the precise extent
is unclear, the legislative record strongly suggests that the mere fact that conduct is capable of characterization as a statutory unfair practice is insufficient to satisfy the
strictures of section 7123(a)(1); the conduct must actually be so characterized and the
claim pursued, by whatever route, as a statutory unfair labor practice, not as something
else.
Id.; see also United States MarshalsServ., 708 F.2d at 1417 (holding that by choosing to litigate
the grievance as a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, the party is foreclosed from
transforming the grievance into a statutory unfair labor practice in order to obtain the judicial review of the court of appeals); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 675 F.2d 612, 614
(4th Cir. 1982) (holding that because neither the arbitrator nor the FLRA decided a unfair labor
practice charge, they lack jurisdiction to give judicial review). The practical application of these
decisions is to prohibit a party that chooses to file a grievance based on contractual grounds, and
loses, from later asserting an unfair labor practice in hopes of getting judicial review under section
7123(a).
152. See Overseas Educ.Ass'n, 824 F.2d at 67. The D.C. Circuit cited a Ninth Circuit decision which recognized Congress' general pro-arbitration policy, and their desire for finality and
speed in the arbitration process. See id.; see also United States Marshals Serv., 708 F.2d at 1420
(explaining that the integrity of the collective bargaining process itself remains a compelling explanation for congressional encouragement to arbitrate).
153. 708 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1983).
154. UnitedMarshalsServ., 708 F.2d at 1420.
155. See OverseasEduc. Ass'n, 824 F.2d at 67.
156. See id.
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A practical consequence of the D.C. Court's ruling in Treasury,'57
for federal sector labor relations is that a new category of arbitration
decisions, abuse of jurisdiction cases, will now be subject to a second
layer of review, after the FLRA.' s
As in a Leedom suit,'59 determining jurisdiction will necessitate the
court to take "a peek at the merits" of the dispute l This "peek at the
merits" to determine whether the FLRA has exceeded its jurisdiction
will likely necessitate full briefing and argument to the Court, thereby
adding months or years and significant expense before an arbitration
award becomes final and binding.' Although this new form of review
jurisdiction is for the limited purpose of determining whether the FLRA
has exceeded its jurisdiction, the speedy finality Congress intended will
be lost.
The D.C. Circuit argued that it is "utterly inconceivable" that Congress would make such a "staggering delegation" of interpretive authority to a "minor three-member commission." '62 They feared that all of
American law would be interpreted by the FLRA. The Ninth Circuit's
attempt to allay this fear by arguing that the FLRA could not force an
agency to conform to its rulings and could only compensate affected
employees, is flawed. Monetary sanctions can have the same effect as if
the FLRA was to mandate a change in policy.
The Ninth Circuit's argument that all of the players are in the executive branch and ultimately answerable to the President is equally as
unrealistic. The idea that the President of the United States is directly
supervising the outcome of a 63grievance between a federal agency and its
union is difficult to imagine.
The circuit split has created an asymmetrical system whereby a
federal agency can petition the D.C. Court of Appeals to review whether
the FLRA exceeded their jurisdiction based upon their status as a fed-

157. 43 F.3d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
158. See Brief for Respondent at 20-21, National Treasury Employees Union, 112 F.3d 402
(9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-70714). The lack of finality of FLRA decisions has led to the belief that
collective bargaining in the federal system is "practically extinct, being replaced by appeals, motions, and cumbersome procedures." Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 214, at A10 (Nov. 6, 1987).
159. For an explanation of Leedom, see supra note 116.
160. Railway Labor Executives v. National Mediation Bd., 988 F.2d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir.
1993), vacatedon other grounds,996 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
161. See Brief for Respondent at 11, United States Dep't of the Treasury, United States Customs Serv. v. FLRA, 43 F.3d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No. 93-1388).
162. Customs, 43 F.3d at 690.
163. It is unfathomable that the President of the United States is micro-managing FLRA decisions dealing with the rather complex subject of Federal Labor Relations.
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eral agency. A union, however, will be foreclosed from such review if
they do not have a jurisdictional basis for bringing the suit in the D.C.
Circuit. 164
The cases that are the focus of this Note are a perfect example of
the asymmetrical system. For jurisdictional reasons, NTEU cannot bring
suit against the Customs Service in the D.C. Circuit, and would likely
be forced to bring the suit in the Ninth Circuit, where they would be unable to obtain judicial review.' 6 The Customs Service, however, can
bring their suit to the D.C. Circuit and can therefore obtain judicial review of FLRA jurisdictional issues."6 This asymmetrical system, while
not unique,"' raises serious fairness concerns which should be addressed
by Congress.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The split in the circuits needs to be resolved in order to create uniformity within the judiciary system. The fairness of the carefully constructed system to regulate federal labor relations is undermined when
one party can obtain judicial review while another is foreclosed review
based solely on where the party is able to obtain jurisdiction.
While the D.C. Circuit has valid policy arguments, 6 ' the significance of these contentions are mitigated by the exceptions to the judicial
bar. There is judicial review of FLRA decisions in the D.C. Circuit in
cases where an agency openly violates a clear mandate of a statute or in
which a constitutional claim is alleged. 6 9
Further, although the FLRA is a three-member commission, it
deals exclusively with federal labor disputes. The Authority, through
164. See Customs, 43 F.3d at 682; Treasury, 112 F.3d at 402.
165. See Treasury, 112F.3d at406.
166. See Customs, 43 F.3d at 691.
167. See Brief for Respondent at 23, National Treasury Employees Union, 112 F.3d 402 (9th
Cir. 1997) (No. 95-70714). In private sector labor relations, employers can contest the NLRB's
unit determination in the court of appeals by refusing to bargain with the union certified for the
disputed bargaining unit and litigating the unit determination in the unfair labor practice case review proceeding. See id. See, e.g., Physicians Nat'l Housestaff Ass'n v. Fanning, 642 F.2d 492
(D.C. Cir. 1980). However, "a union that loses a representation case before the NLRB cannot initiate such indirect review of NLRB unit determinations ... because the union cannot refuse to
bargain." Brief for Respondent at 23, National Treasury Employees Union, 112 F.3d 402 (9th Cir.
1997) (No. 95-70714); Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d 993,
997 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
168. For example, the fact that a large, relatively unchecked power has been delegated to a

small commission.
169.

See Customs, 43 F.3d at 688-89.
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their experiences, become experts in the field. Moreover, although the
FLRA will be called upon to interpret different parts of American law,
the laws that are interpreted by the FLRA are laws that were involved in
the context of a labor dispute. It is reasonable, and quite plausible to believe that Congress intended the FLRA to interpret laws that are involved in a federal labor dispute with the limitation that the disputes do
not involve a clear violation of a statutory mandate or a constitutional
claim.
The dispute between the Customs Service and National Treasury
Employees Union involved a poor decision by the FLRA. To force the
Customs Service to pay its workers overtime, when their services were
no longer required due to a technological advancement, is wasteful. This
led the United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, to usurp jurisdiction and reverse the FLRA's decision. In its decision, the D.C. Circuit
acknowledged that the Leedom exception to the preclusion of judicial
review did not apply and instead invented a new category of reviewable
decisions. The judiciary, however, cannot alter clear congressional intent of the FSLMRS, even under the guise of correcting a misguided
decision.
In establishing the FSLMRS, Congress wanted a system of speed
and finality. To this end, they gave the FLRA the power to arbitrate
grievances between federal agencies and their unions. This power is
diminished by both the Leedom exception which encompasses only errors which ignore a statutory command, and the constitutional claim exception.
While it may not be desirable to have a minor commission interpreting such a wide variety of law, Congress's pro-arbitration policies
seem to have driven the creation of the FSLMRS. Congress has expressly foreclosed judicial review in grievances that do not involve an
unfair labor practice. Therefore, if change is needed, it is not for the
courts, but for Congress to reform.
Brian DanielPfeiffer*
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